Corpus · The Gay Science · Full-text route
Thirty-Four Miniatures and a Catechism
Optional full-text route · Station 19 of 35
Read: Book III, §§242–275, in full, from the original 1882 edition. Begin at §242 and read to the end of Book III. Stop at the title of Book IV and its opening verse.
Allow: About 40–60 minutes, including the passages, this guide, rereading, and a short written response. This is an editorial estimate, not a measured reading time. The primary text is short, about 930 words in the free edition, but it contains 34 separate judgments. Give each one a moment.
Preferred translation: Walter Kaufmann. Free alternative (Thomas Common, The Joyful Wisdom): begin at §242 · §260 · the catechism, §§268–275.
Quotations on this page follow Common’s free translation, including his section titles. Kaufmann’s wording differs, and none of it is quoted here. Many of these aphorisms share a printed page, so a link may land a few lines above the one named; count the section numbers down from there.
Before you read
Book III began with the death of God (§§108–125) and a long run of religious and moral polemic. It ends with a rapid series of sentences, jokes, dialogues, and definitions, most of them one or two lines long. Its final eight sections are a catechism: questions addressed to “thou,” each answered in a few words.
A run like this invites skimming. It also invites the opposite mistake: treating each line as a free-standing slogan. This station asks for something in between. Read the run as a sequence, sort it, and look closely at a few sections that resist you.
The main question: What does Book III end by affirming, and how do its last answers about pity and shame fit the harder claims about cruelty and justice just before them?
How to read a run of miniatures
- First pass, straight through. Read all 34 without stopping to interpret. Put only a mark beside each, using the marks from station 2: P (psychological observation), H (historical claim), V (valuation or ranking), or ? (where Nietzsche himself hedges, as with “perhaps”). Note also who speaks: an “I,” a “we,” a dialogue of A and B, a named speaker, or an impersonal maxim.
- Second pass, with a pencil. Star three sections that resist you: one you disagree with, one you do not understand, and one you think is simply true.
- Group, then close-read. Use the groups below, or make your own. Then work through the notes on the starred sections and the catechism.
You do not need to write about every section. You do need to have read every one.
What to notice
- Who speaks. §259 is spoken by the serpent; §§255 and 262 are dialogues between A and B; the catechism answers questions put to “thou.” What difference does the speaker make to what is claimed?
- “Irrefutable.” The word appears in §265, and a near relative ends §260. Compare them.
- Shame. Follow it through §§273–275. Who is shamed, who is spared, and who is freed?
Close reading
One way to group the run
These groups are this guide’s, not Nietzsche’s. The book prints the sections in one numbered sequence. Many carry their own titles, but none is printed under group headings like these. A section may belong to more than one group.
- What knowledge can own: §§242, 244, 246, 249, 261, 265.
- Praise, blame, and guilt: §§243, 245, 250, 252, 257, 264.
- Greatness and its self-treatment: §§251, 254, 258, 263, 266, 267.
- Voices and turns: §§247, 248, 253, 255, 256, 259, 260, 262.
- The catechism: §§268–275.
Test the grouping against your own marks. Several “knowledge” sections are V as much as P, and the catechism gathers threads from all four groups.
The seeker’s greed and its limit
The run opens with a joke about knowledge as ownership. However great “my greed of knowledge,” the speaker of §242 can take from things only “what already belongs to me”—“the property of others still remains in the things.” Its title is Latin for to each his own. A few lines later, §249 gives the greed its full voice. The seeker of knowledge sighs for “an all-desiring self” that would see through many eyes: “Oh, that I were reincarnated in a hundred individuals!” In this soul, the sigh says, “there is no disinterestedness.” §249, the seeker’s sigh
Put the two together. §249 is the passion for knowledge that station 2 met in §§2–3, confessed without apology as covetousness. §242 sets a limit on what such covetousness can seize. §246 then gives mathematics a modest role: we carry its rigour into the sciences “not in the belief that we shall apprehend things in this way, but in order thereby to assert our human relation to things.” Mark that sentence V as well as P: it is a claim about what knowing is for.
Names and irrefutable errors
§261 defines originality as seeing something “that does not yet bear a name, that cannot yet be named, although it is before everybody’s eyes.” Most people see a thing only once it has a name, so original persons “have also for the most part been the namers of things.” This returns to Book II’s claim that names and valuations help shape what they describe (§58, “Only as Creators!”). §261, originality
Four sections later comes the sharpest line in the run. §265, titled “Ultimate Scepticism”: “But what after all are man’s truths?—They are his irrefutable errors.” The word to weigh is irrefutable. The line does not say that our truths are refuted errors. It says they are errors we cannot refute. Why we cannot is left open. Earlier in Book III, §110 and §121 called our most basic assumptions “articles of faith” that no one could live without, yet “still unproved.” Perhaps we cannot refute them because we live by them. §265, irrefutable errors
Mark it V. It carries no ?: Nietzsche does not hedge here, and the answer to the question is categorical. What stays open is the reason. Ask what it would mean to apply the line to itself. If it is one of “man’s truths,” it is by its own account an irrefutable error. If it is not, what standing does it have? Compare §260: “One only cannot prove himself right; but two are already beyond refutation.” There, irrefutability comes from agreement, not evidence. The joke and the scepticism illuminate each other.
Guilt, praise, and blame
§250 makes the run’s largest single leap. The judges of the witches, and even the witches themselves, were convinced of their guilt—“the guilt, nevertheless, was not there. So it is with all guilt.” The first sentence is an H: it assumes that the witchcraft charged did not exist. The second is a generalization from that case to every case of guilt. The passage does not argue for it. §250, guilt
Before you decide, ask what “guilt” means here. It may mean a feeling of guilt, or the fact of having done wrong. Does the witch case support a claim about the one, the other, or both? The section’s force depends on that distinction. Nietzsche does not draw it.
Around §250, the neighbouring sections treat judgment as something people do rather than discover. §243 finds the “Origin of ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’” in the feeling that “this is not good,” which alone drives anyone to devise an improvement. Do not merge this two-line origin story with the far larger history of “good” and “bad” in the Genealogy of 1887; they make different claims. §245 says the artist praises by choosing a subject. §264 says: “What we do is never understood, but only praised and blamed.”
Cruelty and justice
Just before the catechism, two sections speak about greatness in hard terms. §266: “He who is great is cruel to his second-rate virtues and judgments.” §267: “With a high aim a person is superior even to justice, and not only to his deeds and his judges.” §§266–267, cruelty and justice
Read §266 exactly: its cruelty is turned on oneself, against one’s own lesser virtues and judgments. §267 is not confined in the same way. It sets a person with a high aim above justice itself, not only above his own record and his critics. Mark it V and state it plainly. It is a claim that a high aim can place someone beyond the standard by which others would judge him. The passage gives no limit, and it says nothing about who else pays for the aim. Keep it in view when you reach the humane answers of §§273–274.
The catechism
The last eight sections are questions and answers. Each title is a question, most of them addressed to “thou”; each answer is a phrase. The titles below keep Common’s capitals. §§268–275, the catechism
- §268 What makes Heroic? “To face simultaneously one’s greatest suffering and one’s highest hope.”
- §269 What dost thou Believe in? “In this: That the weights of all things must be determined anew.”
- §270 What Saith thy Conscience? “Thou shalt become what thou art.”
- §271 Where are thy Greatest Dangers? “In pity.”
- §272 What dost thou Love in others? “My hopes.”
- §273 Whom dost thou call Bad? “Him who always wants to put others to shame.”
- §274 What dost thou think most humane? “To spare a person shame.”
- §275 What is the Seal of Liberty Attained? “To be no longer ashamed of oneself.”
Notice the form first. A catechism is a question-and-answer form for teaching the articles of a faith. Here it teaches a creed whose article of belief (§269) is that every standard must be weighed again. Only one answer speaks in the first person (“My hopes”). §270’s answer is spoken in the conscience’s own voice, as a command in quotation marks. It is a command to become what one already is. It asks for discovery and effort at once, a pairing Book IV will take up again when it asks us to become the best students of necessity (§335, station 24).
§269 answers station 2 directly. In §2, the speaker complained that people keep using their scales without asking whether “these weights are not the full amount.” Book III’s creed now makes that complaint a programme: the weights of all things must be determined anew. Mark it V. It says what must be done, not how, or by whom.
The last three answers form a sequence on shame. The bad person wants to shame others. The humane act spares someone shame. The seal of freedom is to be no longer ashamed of oneself. Two answers concern others; the last concerns the self. That order matters, because it keeps the book’s freedom from being only a private achievement. The same person who is free of shame is asked not to inflict it. §275, the seal of liberty
Book III then ends. The next page opens Book IV with a verse dated January 1882, and its first section is a New Year’s wish (§276).
A difficulty
Sparing shame and refusing pity
§271 names pity as “thy greatest danger,” and §274 calls sparing someone shame the most humane act. At first these seem to pull against each other: sparing another person’s shame looks like a form of compassion. One way to reconcile them is to say that pity itself can shame the pitied person. On that reading, the humane act spares others the lowering that pity inflicts. Book IV develops something like this in §338, where our “benefactors” are said to “lower our value and volition more than our enemies.” Whether it fully removes the tension is a question for station 24 and Reading 6.
A second difficulty comes from the order. §§266–267 speak of cruelty and of standing above justice. §§273–274 speak of sparing shame. Three possibilities:
- the humane answers limit the hard ones: cruelty is permitted only against oneself;
- the hard answers limit the humane ones: sparing shame is a courtesy among equals, not a principle of justice;
- the book leaves both standing, without deciding.
Decide which reading the sequence best supports, and name the section that tips it. Do not settle the question by quoting only the gentler lines.
Check your understanding
Try answering before opening each suggested response.
Does §265 say that human truths have been refuted?
No. It calls them “irrefutable errors”: errors we cannot refute. The reason is left open. The line invites the question whether it applies to itself.
What does §250 infer, and from what?
From the witch trials, where judges and accused alike believed in a guilt that “was not there,” it infers “So it is with all guilt.” The first claim concerns one historical case. The second is an unargued generalization, and it is unclear whether it concerns guilt as a feeling or guilt as a fact.
How does §269 connect with §2?
§2 complained that people use their scales without asking whether the weights are right. §269 makes the redetermination of “the weights of all things” an article of belief. The complaint of Book I’s speaker becomes Book III’s creed.
Who is shamed, spared, and freed in §§273–275?
The bad person shames others (§273); the humane person spares others shame (§274); the free person is no longer ashamed of himself (§275). The sequence moves from conduct toward others to a relation to oneself.
Is §259 Nietzsche’s own claim that good and evil are prejudices?
Not straightforwardly. The line is given to the serpent, the tempter of Genesis. The attribution makes it provocative and self-mocking at once. What the book endorses has to be judged from more than this line.
Writing prompt
Write 150–200 words answering:
What does Book III end by believing, and what does it end by refusing?
- Use the catechism, §§268–275, for the belief. Quote no more than two answers.
- Use one of your starred sections from the run for the refusal.
- Name one tension between the two, for example between §267 and §274.
A successful response reads the catechism as a sequence rather than a list of slogans. It notices who speaks in at least one section. It keeps §§266–267 in view rather than quoting only the humane answers.
Continue
End of Book III.
Continue to station 20: Sanctus Januarius: A New Year’s Wish and Its Tests →
Read next: Book IV, the opening verse to January, then §§276–289. Book IV, Sanctus Januarius, opens with a verse dated January 1882 and a New Year’s wish. Its question: is the wish in §276 an achievement or a task?
Previous station: station 18, §§202–241, which uses the same method of grouping miniatures.
Return to the route list in the book guide
A reading guide from Reading Nietzsche · Revised .