Corpus · The Gay Science · Full-text route
Evil Spirits, Unconditional Duties, and an Unfinished Consciousness
Optional full-text route · Station 3 of 35
Read: Book I, §§4–12, in full, from the original 1882 edition. Begin at §4 and stop before §13.
Allow: About 55–75 minutes, including the passages, this guide, rereading, and a short written response. This is an editorial estimate, not a measured reading time. The nine sections total about 2,500 words in the free edition; §7 is the longest.
Preferred translation: Walter Kaufmann. Free alternative (Thomas Common, The Joyful Wisdom): begin at §4 · §7 · §11 · §12.
Quotations on this page follow Common’s free translation, including his section titles. Kaufmann’s wording differs, and none of it is quoted here.
Before you read
Station 2 ended with the claim that every teacher of purpose serves the species while believing he serves something higher. §§4–12 continue that argument in nine shorter sections. They ask what “evil” has done for humanity, who needs unconditional duties, what a real history of morals would require, and how unfinished human consciousness still is. The last of them, §12, asks whether the pursuit of knowledge should aim at comfort.
The main question: Do errors, habits, and science have one value for life—or does the same thing preserve in one form and endanger in another?
Use the marks from station 2: P, H, V, and ? for Nietzsche’s own hedges. Note who speaks in each section. Several of these claims are about the history of the species, which makes H the mark to watch.
What to notice
- “Evil” in quotation marks. In §4, when is “evil” Nietzsche’s word, and when is it the word of the society he describes?
- A programme and its absence. §7 lists the histories that have not yet been written. Ask how many of the neighbouring sections would need those histories as evidence.
- Consciousness. §11 calls it “the last and latest development of the organic.” What follows, on this view, for the knowledge that consciousness holds?
Close reading
The ploughshare of evil
§4 opens with a sweeping claim: “The strongest and most evil spirits have hitherto advanced mankind the most.” They reawakened the passions that orderly society lulls to sleep. They set “opinion against opinion,” by arms, by moving boundary-stones, and above all by violating piety, “but also by new religions and morals!” The same “wickedness,” Nietzsche says, is in every teacher of the new. §4, the strongest and most evil spirits
Watch the quotation marks. “The new, however, is under all circumstances the evil,” and “only the old is the good!” That is the verdict of a society defending its boundaries; Nietzsche reports it in order to turn it. The good are “the agriculturists of the spirit,” who cultivate old thoughts, but every soil is eventually exhausted, “and the ploughshare of evil must always come once more.” §4, the ploughshare
The section ends against a theory of morals “much celebrated, especially in England.” That theory derives “good” and “evil” from accumulated experience of the expedient and the inexpedient. Nietzsche does not name its authors here. His objection is not that usefulness is irrelevant, but that the “evil” impulses are just as useful to the species: “only, their function is different.” Mark this H and V. It extends station 2’s “foolish economy” with the same kind of evidence: the fact that humanity has changed and survived.
Who needs unconditional duties?
§5 asks a psychological question about moral language. Some people need “the strongest words and intonations” to act at all: “revolutionary politicians, socialists, preachers of repentance with or without Christianity.” They speak of duties that are unconditional, because only an unconditional command can justify their “excessive pathos.” Nietzsche names one example, the Italian revolutionary Mazzini. §5, the need for unconditional duties
The second group is larger and less dramatic: people who serve a prince, a party, or “wealthy power,” and feel dishonoured by the service. They need principles “of an unconditional ought” to which they can submit “without shame.” The section ends: “All more refined servility holds fast to the categorical imperative.” The categorical imperative is Kant’s term for a moral command that holds without conditions. §5, refined servility
Mark §5 P. It offers a motive for holding a view, not an argument against the view. Knowing why someone needs a duty to be unconditional does not show that no duty is. Keep that distinction; Book V will state it explicitly (§345, station 26).
A research programme
After a short complaint that thinking has lost its dignity and happens “on the way” (§6), §7 lays out an enormous task “for the laborious.” Everything that has given colour to existence lacks a history: “where would one find a history of love, of avarice, of envy, of conscience, of piety, of cruelty?” There is no comparative history of law and punishment, no study of how the division of the day shapes morals, no “philosophy of nutrition.” The work would need “whole generations” of cooperating scholars. §7, histories not yet written
Then comes the question behind the programme: “whether science is in a position to furnish goals for human action, after it has proved that it can take them away and annihilate them.” If it can, “an experimenting for centuries” would follow. Mark it V: it is a proposal. It leaves its key question open, but it does not hedge its claims, so it takes no ?. An open question and a hedge are different things. Readers who go on to the Genealogy (1887) will recognize some of these topics, especially punishment and conscience; do not assume the later book carries out this programme as stated here. §7, can science furnish goals?
Hidden qualities, late eruptions
§§8–10 turn to qualities we cannot see. §8 compares our unnoticed virtues to the fine sculptures on reptile scales, visible only under a microscope: we have a public diligence and ambition, and probably a second, hidden set—“our reptile scales.” It ends by mocking the moralists who would welcome that idea too quickly: “Oh, ye unexacting creatures!” §9 says that qualities acquired weakly in one generation may erupt in grandchildren: “we are all growing volcanoes.” §8, reptile scales
§10 applies the idea to rare individuals, whom Nietzsche likes to think of as “aftershoots of past cultures.” Such a person “either becomes a great man thereby, or a deranged and eccentric person.” The section then locates these after-effects “principally in the old-established families and castes of a people.” Nothing like it occurs, he says, where “races, habits, and valuations change too rapidly”; an “andante of evolution” is necessary. §10, families and castes
State this plainly. §10 makes a hereditary claim and attaches it to rank: old families and castes preserve what faster-changing populations lose. Mark it H and V. It is introduced with “I like best to think,” and it rests on the language of inheritance and evolution, not on evidence given here. §7 has just said that such histories remain unwritten.
Consciousness unfinished
§11 is the most philosophically dense section of the station. “Consciousness is the last and latest development of the organic, and consequently also the most unfinished and least powerful.” It causes countless mistakes; if the instincts were not much stronger, humanity would have perished through “perverse judging and dreaming with open eyes.” Yet people treat consciousness as the “quintessence of man,” fixed and given. §11, the latest development
That overvaluation, Nietzsche says, has had one use: it slowed consciousness from maturing too fast. The section ends with a task: “to embody knowledge in ourselves and make it instinctive.” Only those see it who have grasped “that hitherto our errors alone have been embodied in us, and that all our consciousness is relative to errors!” §11, embodying knowledge
This is a claim of great consequence for the whole book. If our errors, not our truths, have been built into us, then the knower’s habits are part of what knowledge must examine. Book III returns to it in §§110–111 (station 13 and Reading 3), and Book V in §354 on consciousness and communication (station 28 and Reading 9). Mark it H and V; the evolutionary story is conjecture, but the task it sets does not depend on every detail of the story.
The goal of science
§12 is the second assignment of Reading 1, which gives it a full close reading. On this route, read it as the end of a sequence. §7 asked whether science can supply goals after destroying old ones. §11 made the embodiment of knowledge a task. §12 now asks what goal science should serve: the least possible pain, or a fuller capacity for both pain and delight. It says that science can further either goal, and that it “might also turn out to be the great pain-bringer.” §12, the goal of science
A difficulty
A programme that criticizes its own neighbours
§7 says that the histories of love, cruelty, conscience, law, and punishment have not been written, and that whole generations of scholars would be needed to write them. Yet §4 confidently says that the “evil” impulses have been as useful to the species as the good, and §10 says that rare qualities survive in old families and castes. Those are just the kind of historical claims that §7’s missing histories would be needed to test.
One reading: §§4 and 10 are hypotheses the programme is meant to test, and §7 tells us to hold them loosely. Another: Nietzsche is confident about some conclusions before the evidence exists. A third: the sections work at different levels, with §4 a provocation against complacency and §7 a method. Decide which reading the text best supports. Name the words—“perhaps,” “I like best to think,” “in reality”—that tell you how strongly each claim is meant.
Check your understanding
Try answering before opening each suggested response.
In §4, whose verdict is “only the old is the good”?
The verdict of a society defending its existing order, which calls every innovation evil. Nietzsche reports it in order to argue that the so-called evil impulses are as necessary to the species as the good ones: “only, their function is different.”
Does §5 argue that no duty is unconditional?
Not directly. It explains why certain people need duties to be unconditional: to justify their pathos, or to serve without shame. That is a claim about motive. It does not by itself show that the duty they appeal to is invalid.
What question does §7 place behind its research programme?
“Whether science is in a position to furnish goals for human action, after it has proved that it can take them away.” The section leaves the question open and imagines centuries of experiment to answer it.
What does §11 mean by embodying knowledge?
Making knowledge part of our instincts, as errors have so far been. The claim rests on the view that consciousness is late, weak, and unfinished, and that “all our consciousness is relative to errors.”
Writing prompt
Write 200–250 words answering:
Does §7’s programme strengthen or weaken the confident historical claims of §4 and §10?
- State one claim from §4 or §10 in your own words, and mark its type.
- Say which of §7’s missing histories would be needed to test it.
- Use §11 to say why the knower’s own habits complicate that test.
A successful response states the hereditary and rank claims of §10 plainly, distinguishes a motive (§5) from an argument, and treats §7 as a proposal rather than a finished result.
Continue
Optional checkpoint: you have now read both sections of Reading 1 (§§2 and 12). Its full close reading of them is a useful review. Reading 1 belongs to the ten-session introduction, so its own Next link leads to Reading 2, not back to this route. Return here afterward.
Continue to station 4: Power, Possession, and the Distance That Charms →
Read next: Book I, §§13–20. The book now asks what power and possession have to do with kindness, pity, and love.
Previous station: station 2, §§1–3. Return to the route list in the book guide.
A reading guide from Reading Nietzsche · Revised .